

CONQUEST AND RENTS: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DICTATORSHIP AND VIOLENCE IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

Faisal Z. Ahmed
Princeton University
June 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY

1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE

- 1.1 The puzzle
- 1.2 Argument
- 1.3 Evidence
- 1.4 Contributions
- 1.5 Roadmap

2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

- 2.1 Political violence in Muslim societies
- 2.2 Political economy of rents
- 2.3 Model
- 2.4 Empirical implications
- 2.5 Summary

PART II: CONQUEST

3 THE CONQUEST EQUILIBRIUM

- 3.1 Foundations of Muslim military conquest
- 3.2 Governing institutions
- 3.3 Persistence of centralized autocracy
- 3.4 Islam in non-conquest societies
- 3.5 Final remarks

4 CONQUEST FOSTERED AUTOCRATIZATION

- 4.1 Measurement
- 4.2 Tracing the effect of Muslim conquest
- 4.3 Autocratization during Muslim conquest
- 4.4 Evaluating the channel
- 4.5 Autocratization after Muslim conquest
- 4.6 Summary

5 THE AUTOCRATIC LEGACY OF MUSLIM CONQUEST

- 5.1 Un-doing Muslim conquest: Evidence from medieval Spain
- 5.2 Conquest and democracy in the long-run
- 5.3 Tracing the conquest equilibrium
- 5.4 Decomposing Muslim conquest
- 5.5 Final remarks

PART III: RENTS

6 FUELING AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE

- 6.1 Oil and political regimes
- 6.2 Fueling stable dictatorship
- 6.3 Oil and domestic peace
- 6.4 Transitions to democracy in non-conquest petrostates
- 6.5 Summary

7 AIDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

- 7.1 Identification strategy
- 7.2 Preliminaries: Aid and political (in)stability
- 7.3 Causal estimates
- 7.4 Authoritarian resilience
- 7.5 Final remarks

8 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN NON-CONQUEST SOCIETIES

- 8.1 Foreign transfers and democratic transitions
- 8.2 Corroborative statistical evidence
- 8.3 Cross-national causal evidence
- 8.4 Summary

PART IV: IMPLICATIONS

9 CONCLUSION

- 9.1 Political violence in Muslim societies
- 9.2 Rents and development
- 9.3 The legacy of Muslim conquest