@article{203866,
  author = {Faisal Z. Ahmed and Alexander Slaski},
  title = {Ambassadors as CEOs: Evidence from Trade Data},
  abstract = {<p>National governments routinely deploy their diplomatic corps to advance their trade policies. While economists have studied this in multilateral negotiations or with na- tional leader visits, scholarship examining the role of more regularized bilateral diplomacy has received less attention. In this paper, we study how the heads of embassies (i.e,. ambassadors) can affect bilateral trade. Focusing on one of the largest diplomatic corps, we compile original monthly level data on US ambassadorial postings over a 50 year period and use the timing of US presidential inaugurations as an instrumental variable to show that periods of ambassadorial vacancies reduce US monthly exports, but do not affect US imports. These findings are driven by the vacancies of career diplomats and are magnified in poorer countries and those with an inferior quality of governance. Our findings suggest that ambassadors can affect export performance, particularly those with more experience and who are posted in weak institutional environments.</p>
},
  year = {2022},
  language = {eng},
}